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Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment's
Protection of Legislative Voting
Steven N. Sherr
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of
information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged by our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper
sense, govern them. Over our governing, they have no power. Over
their governing we have sovereign power.
Alexander Meiklejohnt
INTRODUCTION
The ideal of popular sovereignty inspired the creation of the American
Republic.2 In an ideal republican government, elected representatives express
and implement the people's will through legislative speech and activities.
However, an elected legislator's ability to perform these representative functions
depends largely upon her ability to speak freely and to make independent
choices. In short, republican government requires legislative independence.3
It follows that constraints on independent legislative speech or voting under-
mine the legislature's representative function.
As an institutional approximation of the republican ideal, the American
constitutional system depends upon legislative independence for sustenance and
legitimacy. American legislatures, the political institutions most responsive to
the public due to regular and frequent elections, supposedly infuse the people's
will into the machinery of government. As institutions designed to facilitate
decision through debate, legislatures channel rich public debate into effective
democratic self-government. As a result, more than any other institution of
republican government, legislatures thrive when debate inside their walls is
1. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absohte, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257.
2. The Preamble's invocation of "Ve the People" exercising the power to establish the Constitution
demonstrates the Founders' rhetorical commitment to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. See also GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969).
3. This Note uses the terms "legislative independence" and "legislative freedom" interchangeably to
describe a state of affairs wherein legislators are free to represent the interests of constituents without undue
interference from the executive branch or other nonjudicial governmental entities.
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"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."4 Conversely, coercion of legislative
activity-especially voting, by the executive branch or a superior level of
government, such as Congress-threatens the constitutional function of legisla-
tures by distorting debate and undermining their capacity to represent the true
sovereign, the people.
Until recently, legal protection of legislative independence rested exclusive-
ly on the United States Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause,5 similar state
constitutional provisions,6 and common law notions of legislative immunity.
Stepping beyond these traditional notions of legislative immunity, however,
three recent federal decisions have concluded that the First Amendment7
provides a separate constitutional safeguard for the uniquely expressive act of
legislative voting.8 This Note agrees with their conclusion and further argues
that federal statutes that condition funding for states on the enactment of
particular legislation should trigger First Amendment scrutiny.9
Part I explores traditional constitutional and common law foundations for
protecting legislative speech and voting. Part II summarizes the major issues
presented in Clarke v. United States, which is the first federal decision to find
a federal conditional spending measure invalid because it violated legislators'
First Amendment rights.1t Finally, Part III examines the scope of the First
Amendment's protection of legislative voting and suggests that courts can use
traditional First Amendment balancing tests to weigh governmental interests
in imposing particular conditions on states against the interests of free expres-
sion and rich public debate in state and local legislatures.
4. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). While not referring to legislative speech
in particular, the Court, per Justice Brennan, declared that the First Amendment requires the Court to
evaluate restrictions on expression "against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id.
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 ("[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representa-
tives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
6. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...
8. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (en bane); Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 501 (1989);
Wrzeski v. City of Madison, 558 F Supp. 664 (,V.D. Wis. 1983).
9. Examples of federal funding conditioned on state legislative action abound. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C.
§ 131(b) (1990) (conditioning 10% of federal highway funds on a state's adopting federal standards
governing the control of outdoor advertising along federal interstates and primary highways); 23 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1990) (conditioning 5% of federal highway funds on state's adoption of national minimum
drinking age); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (1983) (conditioning federal funds forAid for Families with Dependent
Children on state establishing or designating a"single State agency" to supervise administration of the plan);
and 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) (conditioning federal loans and grants in support of any state's urban mass
transit construction projects upon state's adoption of federally-prescribed labor standards to govern projects).
10. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (en banc). The full Court of Appeals vacated Clarke because the appropriation statute which the three-
judge panel of Court of Appeals invalidated on First Amendment grounds lapsed prior to the full court's
rehearing of the case. 915 F.2d 699, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacating as moot, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). Thus, the full court vacated Clarke for reasons completely unrelated to the First Amendment
issues raised by the panel decision. Accordingly, this Note relies on Clarke solely for its reasoning and not
for its legal significance.
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I. FOUNDATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF LEGISLATIVE SPEECH AND VOTING:
SEPARATION OF POWERS, FEDERALISM, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
Although the notion that the First Amendment protects legislative voting
has only limited precedential support," it comports with well-established
principles of legislative independence. The scarcity of precedent affording First
Amendment protection for legislative voting initially discourages adoption of
a doctrine allowing judicial review of conditional spending measures that give
Congress substantial leverage over the states." However, as discussed below,
shielding state legislators from congressionally-imposed liability actually
reinforces the Constitution's preservation of state legislators as political counter-
balances to the national government and as prolocutors of the people's will.
Also, a review of more traditional forms of legislative immunity will demon-
strate that constitutional and common law protections of legislative indepen-
dence have already strengthened the separation of powers and the structure of
federalism in the American system. Specifically, the Speech or Debate Clause
of the U.S. Constitution and similar provisions in many state constitutions help
maintain the separation of powers between legislative and executive branches
in both federal and state governments.
A. Speech or Debate Clause: Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Legislative Immunity
The Founding Fathers considered freedom of speech in the national legisla-
ture integral to the maintenance of a republican government. 3 Following
England's lead, 4 they considered legislative independence from the coercive
powers of the executive a necessary component of the separation of powers
11. Clarke cited only two cases for the direct proposition that the First Amendment protects legislative
voting. 886 F.2d at 411-12 (citing Miller, 878 F.2d 523 (Town Board of Selectmen's removal of elected
members of Hull Redevelopment Authority, because of Authority's disagreement over whether to approve
subsidized housing project, violated Authority members' First Amendment rights); Wrzeski, 558 F Supp.
664 (city council member's First Amendment rights abridged by city ordinance subjecting her to censure
and fines if she chose to abstain from voting on any question put before the city council)).
12. Indeed one of the factors weighing in the D.C. Circuit's decision to vacate the panel opinion in
Clarke was "avoidance" of a "gratuitous conflict with a co-equal branch of government." 915 F.2d at 708.
13. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202-03 (1880); see also James Wilson, Of the Legislative
Department, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 3, 37-38 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896).
14. American legislative immunity evolved from British parliamentary privilege. The English Bill of
Rights provided: "That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." An Act for Declaring the Rights and
Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown, 1 W. & M. ch. 36, § 9 (1689). The
Supreme Court also has noted that from its origins in the conflicts between the House of Commons and
the British Crown, legislative immunity has existed primarily to protect legislative institutional independence
from executive coercion, rather than as a personal right to protect individual legislators from royal penalties.
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
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which comprised the structural core of the new constitutional system. t5 Thus,
in order to shield the deliberative process within Congress from interference
by the executive branch, the Founders drafted the Speech or Debate Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 16 Indeed, the fundamental purpose of the Speech or
Debate Clause is "freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight
that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator."'17
The fact that the constitutions of every state except Florida and North
Carolina provide some form of protection for legislators underscores this
national commitment to legislative independence.18 Massachusetts may have
the most acclaimed state legislative immunity provision because the earliest and
most famous interpretation of such a provision appeared in that state's 1808
case of Coffin v. Coffin.'9 The Coffin opinion, often cited for establishing the
parameters of legislative immunity,' specifically included "the giving of a
vote" as one of the representative functions protected under the state's im-
munity clause.2 '
Although it is a state court's interpretation of a state constitution's legisla-
tive immunity provision, Chief Justice Parson's Coffin opinion, written "so
early after the formation of the Federal Constitution,"'  has influenced nearly
all subsequent interpretations of the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause. Not surprisingly, when the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Constitu-
tion's Speech or Debate Clause for the first time in Kilbourn v. Thompson,2'
it adopted a relatively broad view of legislative immunity which included the
votes of legislators.24 While some Supreme Court decisions have since pro-
pounded a more restrictive view of the Clause than expressed in Coffin and
15. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966); see also Alexander J. Celia, The Doctrine of
Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to Legislative Coequality,
8 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1019, 1067-70 (1974); Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L REV. 1113, 1120-40 (1973).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
17. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
18. The constitutions of 48 states contain some form of legislative immunity provision. Thirty-nine
of these provisions specifically shield "speech" and/or "debate" in the legislature. The immunity provisions
of seven states (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and Texas) do not mention
"speech" or "debate," but immunize legislators from arrest while the legislature is in session. California's
constitution provides immunity from "civil process" during a session of the legislature. CAL. CONsT. art.
IV, § 14. And South Carolina's constitution protects legislators in their "persons and estates." S.C. CONsT.
art. 1, § 14.
19. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
20. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425, 515 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 660 (1972) (Brennan, I., dissenting).
21. 4 Mass. at 27.
22. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
23. Id.




Kilbourn, 25 no court has questioned the inclusion of legislative voting as an
activity protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
26
Thus, from the early days of the Republic, courts have recognized that the
Speech or Debate Clause and state constitutional legislative immunity provi-
sions are integral to the separation of powers. Courts have also consistently
interpreted these provisions to include voting within the scope of protected
legislative activity.
B. Tenney v. Brandhove: Legislative Immunity and Federalism
While Coffin and Kilbourn explain how legislative immunity reinforces the
separation of powers, the Supreme Court's extension of the federal immunity
doctrine to state legislators in Tenney v. Brandhove27 has important federalism
implications. In Tenney, the Court found that the California State Senate Fact-
Finding Committee on Un-American Activities (the "Tenney Committee") and
its individual members were not civilly liable for alleged violations of Brand-
hove's civil liberties resulting from his compelled appearance before the Com-
mittee.18 Framing its holding as a rule of statutory construction, the Court
determined that federal common law legislative immunity limited Congress'
authority to make state legislators answerable in causes of action based on
federal statutes. In enacting the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes under
which Brandhove sued, Congress may not have had the power to impinge on
the common law tradition of "legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil
War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Govern-
ments here .... ,2 Furthermore, the Court held that even claims that a state
legislature acted with an "unworthy purpose" do not destroy the legislative
privilege which exists for the "public good."30 This result comports with the
historically expansive reading of legislative immunity established by the Speech
or Debate Clause. Since the Tenney Committee's investigation of Brandhove
fell within "the bounds of legislative power" and did not usurp "functions
25. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 625 (1972).
26. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that the Speech or Debate Clause protects
legislative voting. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306,311-12 (1973); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617; Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969).
27. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
28. Brandhove claimed that his civil liberties guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
enforced under 8 U.S.C. § 43 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989)) and 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1989)), were violated because the hearing he was required to attend "'was
not held for a legislative purpose,' but was designed to intimidate and silence [Brandhove] and deter and
prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights .... Tenney, 341 U.S. at 371 (1951) (quot-
ing Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1950)).
29. 341 U.S. at 376. But cf. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 n.10 (2d Cir. 1966) (legislative
immunity from claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not extend to state administrative officials).
30. 341 U.S. at 377.
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exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive," the Committee could
"assert a right to call [Brandhove] before it and examine him."31
Although Tenney did not alter the scope of activities covered by legislative
immunity, it transformed the doctrine of legislative immunity from a rule
reinforcing the separation of powers into a principle of federalism. For the
purposes of this Note, Tenney's extension of the federal immunity doctrine to
state legislators established a common law predicate for the notion that the
federal rights enshrined in the First Amendment might also shield state and
local legislative activities from congressional encroachments.
To be sure, a constitutionally enforceable legislative privilege would
buttress the role of state legislatures and state legislators as independent sources
of political power in the federal system. Such a result, however, is not radical.
The notion that the "legislative" activities of popularly elected state legislators
enjoy legal protection against federal intrusion has both constitutional and
historical support.
From the early years of the American Republic, state governments provided
a structural counterbalance to the federal government. This structural role
manifested itself prominently in constitutional provisions specifically crafted
to ensure significant state influence in national policy decisions.32 Indeed,
Virginia and Kentucky's defiant response to the Federalist central government's
adoption of the Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrates the capacity of indepen-
dent state legislatures to act as defenders of political liberty against a self-
interested national government and graphically illustrates the importance of state
legislative immunity from federal intrusion.33
In this spirit, the holding in Tenney confirms the importance of independent
state governments in the federal system. If not limited by legislative immunity,
federal statutes such as those in Tenney threaten to impose civil liability on
individual state legislators and thus to deter them from the independent exercise
of their representative functions. Furthermore, if state governments are to
perform their unique political function in the federal system, state legislators
must not feel constrained by congressional attempts to control their legislative
activities. Thus, Tenney's finding of federal common law legislative immunity,
while derived from the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause, a separa-
tion of powers mechanism, ultimately prescribes a common law rule of federal-
31. Id. at 378.
32. In addition to the states' role in electing the President under the electoral college system (U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 1), their status in the structure of the Senate (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3), and their role in
amending the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. V), states retain powers under the Tenth Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
33. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1135 (1987) (applauding
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-1800 for fusing the "rhetoric of federalism and freedom" while




ism that limits the power of the federal government over the activities of state
legislators.'
C. Free Speech: Legislative Immunity and Popular Sovereignty
While Tenney derives a common law rule of federalism from the Speech
or Debate Clause, it also reaffirms the centrality of legislative immunity to
representative government.35 Under both the Speech or Debate Clause and
common law legislative immunity, legislators are the immediate beneficiaries
of broad speech and voting freedoms designed to facilitate uninhibited debate
and decisionmaking. Yet these freedoms are more than mere privileges for
individual legislators. Fundamentally, they protect the entire polity's right to
democratic self-government. In this sense, the function of legislative immunity
34. It is important, however, not to overread Tenney. Justice Black's concurrence in Tenney is
significant for its clarification of what the Court did not hold in its opinion. While individual legislators
enjoy broad personal immunity for their actions, the constitutional validity of legislative action is not
coextensive with this immunity. 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (Black, J., concurring). While the Court held
that Brandhove could not sue the Tenney Committee and its members under the federal civil rights statutes,
it does not follow that the Tenney Committee's persecution of Brandhove was legal. If the Committee
proceeded to fine or imprison him on perjury, contempt, or other charges, Brandhove could have defended
himself on the grounds that the resolution creating the Committee or the Committee's actions under it were
"unconstitutional and void." Id. at 380. However, such action was not at issue before the Court and thus
the Committee's inquisition of Brandhove did not, in the majority's view, violate Brandhove's constitutional
rights. This limitation on Tenney also limits the conclusions of this Note. This Note concludes that the First
Amendment shields legislative speech and activities from certain federal intrusions. However, in the case
of a state legislature violating the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, this Note does not argue that a First Amendment defense can prevent vigorous federal enforcement
of those Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
A related question was raised in the "Yonkers" case, Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990).
In Spallone, the Supreme Court found that the district court's imposition of sanctions against individual
council members, as opposed to sanctions against the city as a whole, exceeded the discretionary power
of the court to enforce a consent decree in a statutory and constitutional civil rights case. Id. at 634-35. This
raises an important question for this Note, which argues that First Amendment scrutiny is triggered when
Congress conditions federal funding on states enacting prescribed legislation.
A broad reading of the dicta in Spallone might suggest that only threats of personal fines levied against
individual legislators, as opposed to the legislative body as a whole, can trigger constitutional review. There
are at least two reasons why Spallone should not be read in this way. First, Spallone is not a First Amend-
ment opinion. While the Yonkers legislators contended that the district court's orders violated their right
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment, the Court did not find it necessary to rule on that question
because the orders were an abuse of discretion under "traditional equitable principles." Id. at 631. As a
result, Spallone should not be read as limiting First Amendment protection of legislative voting to circum-
stances in which individual legislators face fines or penalties. This Note, on the other hand, argues that First
Amendment scrutiny can be triggered by congressionally imposed burdens on states and localities if such
burdens necessarily contemplate legislators voting a certain way. Second, in Spallone the district court was
attempting to enforce a consent decree. Unlike states compelled to accept a condition, parties to a consent
decree agree to its terms. Therefore, the analogy between compelled expression in the conditional spending
cases and the elective nature of a consent decree is quite attenuated.
35. In Tenney, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "It is significant that legislative freedom was so carefully
protected by constitutional framers at a time when Jefferson expressed fear of legislative excess .... For
the loyalist executive and judiciary had been deposed, and the legislature was supreme in most States during
and after the Revolution." 341 U.S. at 375 (citations omitted).
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mirrors that of the First Amendment in society at large: to protect and promote
an essential mechanism of democracy---"rich public debate.
36
However, rich public debate represents only the means, not the ends, of
democratic self-government. A properly functioning democracy often requires
certain limitations on legislative immunity and freedom of speech to ensure that
these freedoms facilitate, rather than inhibit, rich public debate and democratic
self-government. Liberated but not lawless, legislators and ordinary citizens
alike must abide by regulations to ensure that louder or more pervasive speakers
do not "drown out" others and to guarantee that discourse does not devolve into
chaos.
37
1. Popular Sovereignty and Freedom of Speech: The Legislature's
Representational Link to the Polity
Freedom of speech and popular sovereignty are inextricably linked. While
a people may possess some of the trappings of democratic self-government,
such as the right to elect representatives and to vote on matters of public
concern, a people can never truly be sovereign without freedom of speech.
Specifically, the ability to freely and knowledgeably discuss and debate matters
of public concern is a critical component of democratic decisionmaking. Con-
versely, the abridgment of free debate and discussion undermines the people's
ability to govern themselves.
In the American constitutional system, sovereignty ultimately resides with
the people. Prior to ratification of the Constitution, the colonists formed state
governments to act as agents of their will. With ratification of the Constitution,
the people of the newly formed nation delegated additional powers to another
set of agents in the national government. Significantly, however, the Ninth"
and Tenth Amendments reserved all powers not delegated to the national
government for both the people and the states. The power to elect representa-
tives and the power, by a supermajority of state legislatures, to amend the
Constitution are prominent among these reserved powers. Thus, while the
national government became, in many respects, the primary implementor of the
people's will, the people retained the ultimate power to govern themselves.
36. The phrase "rich public debate" is borrowed from Owen Fiss. It connotes a state of affairs wherein
issues of public concern receive "full and fair consideration." Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986). Fiss argues that "rich public debate," like Meiklejohn's
"freedom of speech," infra text accompanying notes 39-44, is a vital component of democratic self-govern-
ment.
37. See, e.g., Bellotti v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White's dissent in Bellotti is an eloquent defense of a restriction on individual speech in the form
of campaign spending limits. By making room for less pervasive voices the spending limits enhanced public
discourse regarding a ballot measure in Massachusetts. See also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 781 (1987).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
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Although the Ninth and Tenth Amendments nominally reserved the people's
ultimate governing authority, it was the First Amendment's protection of the
freedom of speech that, in reality, empowered the people to govern themselves.
Alexander Meiklejohn has explained that the protection of the freedom of
speech constitutes a general guarantee of political liberty and democratic self-
government.
39
In Meiklejohn's view, voting constitutes "the official expression of a self-
governing man's judgment on issues of public policy."4 According to this
theory, free speech and debate are integral components of the freedom to vote.
Consequently, no government official may abridge the people's right to free
speech and debate on issues of public concern without infringing on self-
government. Elected or not, these government officials are no more than
"subordinate agen[t]s" of the people.41 Therefore, attempts by these agents
to stifle freedom of speech inevitably undermines the people's right to govern
themselves.
While governmental noninterference with free speech and debate is a
condition precedent to Meiklejohn's conception of democratic self-government,
its realization requires significantly more than the government simply leaving
voters alone. Only if voters can expose themselves to the wide range of human
communications from which they can derive "knowledge, intelligence [and]
sensitivity to human values," will they obtain the capacity for "sane and objec-
tive judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." 2 Within this
"wide range of communications," Meiklejohn specifically included "education,
in all its phases," "the achievements of philosophy and the sciences," "literature
and the arts," and public discourse on policy issues.43 Each of these "commu-
nications," according to Meiklejohn, is worthy of First Amendment protec-
tion.44
It follows from Meiklejohn's analysis that the legislature's dependence on
free speech for democratic viability is based on three factors. First, truly
representative decisionmaking in the legislature depends on robust and informed
public debate to elicit the myriad viewpoints comprising the will of the people.
Second, discourse within the chamber must be uninhibited, permitting the
legislature to grapple with all relevant viewpoints and, thereby, to reach deci-
sions that reflect the will of the people. Finally, because legislators are also
"speakers," their debates, pronouncements, edicts, and activities all become part
of the ongoing dialogue between the people and their agents in government.
In this way, freedom of speech inside the legislature completes a continuous
39. Meiklejohn, supra note 1.
40. Id. at 256.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 257.
44. Id.
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cycle in which the people express preferences to their legislators, legislators
"translate" these preferences into legislative speech and other communicative
activities, and legislators communicate these "translations" to the people
through their voting records. These legislative communications, in turn, enrich
the public discourse and, ultimately, help voters form preferences for candi-
dates.45
The rationale behind a legal rule protecting legislators' utterances argues
pointedly for affording similar protections to legislative voting. The Clarke
court embraced the notion that votes help inform the electorate: "[A] legislator's
voting record is 'the best indication of [his or her] position on specific issues
and his or her ideological persuasions.' ,46 Critics might argue that in reality
legislative "logrolling" and other internal "vote exchanges" distort the linkage
between a legislator's duty to discharge his understanding of public preferences
and a particular instance of vote casting.47 Presumably, however, a voter's
image of her legislator will be shaped by the entire voting record, where the
larger sample will correct for occasional deviations from the legislator's actual
understanding of public preferences.48 Moreover, it is possible that the exchange
of votes within a legislature does not significantly threaten the representational
linkage between legislators and constituents. In return for voting as his col-
league prefers, a shrewd legislator is likely to increase his own effectiveness
at promoting the interests of his constituents in subsequent matters.
In addition to providing a powerful index by which voters may ascertain
a legislator's position, the actual casting of a legislative vote is a unique
statement of preference.4 9 It is a form of expression distinct from other forms
in the legislative process. Precisely because it channels preferences into the triad
of "aye," "nay," and "abstain," legislative voting is a powerful mode of collec-
tive expression. Also, under majoritarian rules, the prevailing position on any
question put to a vote is an additional form of expression of preference by the
entire body of the people's representatives. 0 Thus, both collectively and
individually, legislators' votes, as much as speech in the chamber, are part of
the stream of information that makes up public discourse in a democracy.
45. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1966).
46. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
1988, at xviii (1988)).
47. Concern about the counterrepresentational effect of logrolling inspired inclusion of the following
promise in the oath that members of the Mississippi state legislature must take: "I will not vote for any
measure or person because of a promise of any other member of this legislature to vote for any measure
or person, or as a means of influencing him or them so to do. So help me God." MIss. CONsT. art. IV, § 40.
48. See generally POLITICS IN AMERICA: THE 100TH CONGRESS (Alan Ehrenhalt ed., 1987) (biennial
compilation of profiles, votes and interest group ratings of individual members of Congress).
49. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
50. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) ("Voting and preparing committee reports are
the individual and collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process.").
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2. Valid Limitations on Legislative Speech and Voting
While representative government may require broad freedom of speech for
legislators, competing considerations may limit this freedom. Obviously, legisla-
tive immunity does not apply to illegal or unconstitutional legislative action.5
Similarly, people who serve as legislators, when acting legally, yet "outside the
sphere of legitimate legislative activity," are not immune to civil liabilities
stemming from their nonlegislative speech or activities.52
On the other hand, legislative procedures that restrict speech to help resolve
debate and expedite decision, such as time limitations on floor debates, usually
pass judicial scrutiny because of the public interest in an efficient lawmaking
process. As a result, courts have generally upheld internal rules to limit debate
on a question53 or to allocate legislative committee assignments in such a way
as to distribute power unevenly within the legislature.5
Finally, as Part III of this Note suggests, even if the First Amendment
protects legislative voting, Congress could justify restrictions on state legislative
voting in the form of a conditional spending measure by demonstrating either
a "substantial" or a "compelling" governmental interest. Before exploring these
particular implications of First Amendment protection of legislative voting,
however, this Note briefly reviews the most recent and powerful application
of the protection.
II. CLARKE V. UNITED STATES: LEGISLATIVE VOTING AS "NEw TERRITORY"
FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The full D.C. Circuit ultimately vacated the three-judge panel's holding in
Clarke v. United States because the appropriations statute that it invalidated
lapsed prior to the full court's rehearing of the case. Nonetheless, Judge
Edwards' initial decision still provides a useful analytic framework for under-
51. For an example of unprotected illegal activity, see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)
(receipt of money in exchange for Senator's vote and his promise to vote in certain way was not within
sphere of legitimate legislative activity); see also Justice Black's concurrence in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (Black, J., concurring).
52. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376: see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (Speech or Debate
Clause does not protect members of Congress from liability for transmittal of information in press releases
or newsletters).
53. Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1981). Time limitations on floor debates and speeches
serve a dual function. First, they facilitate decision by setting a definite cut-off point for discussion. Second,
they promote rich discourse in the legislature by assuring that individual legislators or particular issues do
not completely dominate to the exclusion of others.
54. Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977). Internal legislative procedures in Daids and Parker
that restrict legislative voting are distinguishable from congressionally-imposed restrictions on legislative
voting and do not warrant judicial scrutiny. Even if subject to First Amendment analysis, the need to
dispense with legislative business meets the compelling-government-interest standard required under strict
First Amendment scrutiny. Internal rules restricting expression do not offend notions of popular sovereignty,
but rather promote majoritarianism.
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standing how federal conditional spending implicates the First Amendment.55
Prior to vacatur, Clarke v. United States had invalidated the Armstrong Amend-
ment to the 1989 D.C. Appropriations Act.56 The Armstrong Amendment
conditioned the entire District of Columbia budget on the District government's
adoption of an exemption to the District of Columbia Human Rights Law.57 The
exemption specifically permitted religious organizations to deny any services
or benefits to homosexuals. 58 The court determined that when Congress exercis-
es its "near-plenary authority" to create institutions of government for the Dis-
trict and to define their responsibilities,5 9 it must "'not contravene any provision
of the Constitution.'-"60 Judge Edwards characterized the Armstrong Amend-
ment as an unconstitutional condition and noted that "[t]his limitation on Congr-
ess' powers is merely an instance of the general principle that the Government
may not disregard the strictures of the Constitution when conferring discre-
tionary benefits. '61 As a result, so long as the representative form of govern-
ment established by the Home Rule Act in 1974 remains effective,62 Congress
must respect the "'wide[] latitude' that the First Amendment guarantees the
[District's City] Council members as legislators 'to express their views on
issues of policy,'63 ... including their 'right to vote freely on issues as they
arise.' " Because the Armstrong Amendment "coerces" Council members to
vote for particular legislation and because the interests asserted by the United
States65 could not justify the abridgment of Council members' First Amendment
rights, the court found the Armstrong Amendment to be unconstitutional.6
Specifically, the court applied the First Amendment test set forth in United
55. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (en bane).
56. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 145, 102 Stat. 2269-14
(1988).
57. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1981).
58. The Armstrong Amendment was a response to a local District of Columbia appellate court's holding
that a section of the D.C. Human Rights Law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1981), amended by Pub. L. No.
101-168, § 141, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 1284, required Georgetown University to provide two student
gay-rights groups equal access to university facilities and services. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane).
59. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 406 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
60. Id. at 410 (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973)).
61. Id.
62. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198,
87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified, in part, as amended, in scattered sections of 2, 5, 29, 31, 40 U.S.C. (1989)).
63. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 417 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966)).
64. Id. (quoting Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 532-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 501
(1989)).
65. The United States claimed two interests, both of which were rejected as insufficient to justify the
restriction of expression. First, conditioning District funds on legislative action by the Council allowed the
Senate to secure an amendment to the D.C. Code without violating the prohibition on "general legislation"
in appropriations bills contained in Senate Rule XVI, para. 4. Second, the United States claimed an interest
in compelling the Council to enact the required legislation itself in order to maximize "subsequent local
control," because when the coercive conditions of the Armstrong Amendment expired, the Council would
be free to repeal the once-required legislation; whereas, if Congress enacted the amendments directly, no
opportunity for repeal by the Council would exist. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 414-15.
66. Id. at 417.
Legislative Voting
States v. O'Brien,67 which requires that a general regulation of conduct that
incidentally abridges speech "'furthers an important or substantial.. . interest'
and imposes 'no greater [a restriction of speech] than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest . . . ."' Using this standard of review, the court found
insufficient the government's asserted interest in restricting Council members'
right to free expression through voting.6s
Although one judge on the D.C. Circuit panel concluded that the court's
conclusion seemed "compelled" by Supreme Court precedent, 69 he also recog-
nized that the decision opened up a substantial "new territory" of constitutional
law.0 First, the opinion boldly reconceptualized the legal status of the statuto-
rily-created District government by affording members of the District City
Council a constitutional position equal to that of other local and state legisla-
tors.71 While the court's analogy between the District Council members and
other local legislators raises interesting questions about the constitutional status
of the District, this Note focuses on the court's unique interpretation of the First
Amendment. Before Clarke, no legislator had ever attempted to employ the
First Amendment to invalidate an act of Congress as restrictive of her free
expression rights. Undeterred by the fact that its decision might implicate
"political questions,"72 the court discovered a potential First Amendment
limitation on Congress' use of conditional spending to legislate vicariously for
the District of Columbia. This Note argues that the same limitation might also
apply to conditional spending measures that inhibit the independent legislative
voting of elected state and local representatives.
67. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding conviction under statute prohibiting burning draft cards, even
though statute might incidentally abridge free expression, because government demonstrated substantial
interest unrelated to suppression of free expression). Incidentally, the Clarke court suggested that a strict
scrutiny evaluation of the Armstrong Amendment as a content-based regulation of speech might be
appropriate. 886 F.2d at 413 (relying on Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)). The appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to restrictions on legislative voting is discussed in
more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
68. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 413 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
69. Id. at 417 (Buckley, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 418.
At what point, for example, does a federal grant-in-aid program cross the line that separates the
encouragement of state or municipal action from its coercion? Are the constitutional rights of
corporate directors and university trustees comparable to those of state and municipal legislators?
And when (if ever) is a particular government interest important enough to justify any burden
on legislative speech?
Id.. see also Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacating as moot, 886 F.2d 404
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
71. Clarke found that "members of the Council are 'legislators' in every traditional sense." 886 F.2d
at 410. Prior to Clarke, judicial understanding of the District's status rejected any notion of local sovereignty
for its citizens: "flhile the District [is] 'a separate political community,' its sovereign power [is] lodged
in the Congress." District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 107 (1953) (quoting
Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889)).
72. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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III. BEYOND CLARKE: APPLYING FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY TO FEDERAL
CONDITIONAL SPENDING MEASURES
The First Amendment rationale for limiting Congress' use of conditional
spending measures in the District of Columbia suggests limiting the use of such
measures outside the nation's capital as well. Thus, First Amendment protection
of legislative voting should limit the federal government's use of conditional
spending to dictate policy to states and localities. In the absence of a First
Amendment argument similar to the approach taken in Clarke, challenges to
federal conditional spending measures would necessarily raise vexing political
questions about the proper limitation of federal influence over state and local
policymaking. Now these issues can be raised in justiciable First Amendment
claims. In some instances, application of the First Amendment would deprive
the federal government of the power to condition funding to states on state or
local enactment of particular federal policies.
A. The First Amendment's Protection of Legislative Independence Alters the
Distribution of Power Between the Federal Government and State and
Local Legislators
First Amendment protection of legislative voting, as compared with protec-
tions available under traditional notions of legislative immunity, substantially
strengthens the capacity of legislators to challenge threats to their legislative
independence. As a result, state and local legislators could use the courts more
vigorously to challenge conditions on federal spending.
While common law and constitutional legislative immunities generally
preserve the representative character of a legislator's activities, reinforce the
separation of powers, and buttress the safeguards of federalism, they do not
shield legislators from subtle restraints on legislative independence such as
conditional spending. Because conditional spending measures do not impose
criminal or civil penalties on individual legislators, they do not infringe on the
legislative immunity protected by the common law73 or by the Speech or Debate
Clause.74 Yet conditioning federal funding on the adoption of prescribed
legislation still can decisively influence state and local legislative voting.
Had it not been vacated, the D.C. Circuit's original decision in Clarke v.
United States would have been the first federal decision to recognize the poten-
tially distorting effect of conditional spending measures on independent legisla-
tive voting. As a result, Clarke also would have been the first decision to hold
that the First Amendment limits the use of conditional spending to influence
73. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
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legislative voting." A First Amendment rule protecting legislative voting nomi-
nally would guarantee individual legislators the right to vote freely and, more
fundamentally, promote the people's paramount interest in representative
legislatures. Yet perhaps the most significant implication of such a rule would
be a restructuring of the relationship between local, state, and national govern-
mental entities in the federal system.
In Miller v. Town of Hull, for example, the First Circuit delineated the legal
limits of the Town Board of Selectmen's control over the votes of the elected
members of the town's Redevelopment Authority.76 The Miller court determined
that the Board's removal of Redevelopment Authority members due to a dis-
agreement over the Authority's decision to proceed with a housing project for
the elderly violated the First Amendment.7 7 While not a conditional spending
case, Miller demonstrated that the First Amendment can shield legislative voting
when traditional notions of legislative immunity fail to protect the public
interest in legislative independence. At the same time, Miller redefined the
relationship between two governmental entities by demarcating a constitutional
limit on the Hull Board of Selectmen's influence over the town's elected
Redevelopment Authority. Similarly, Clarke's application of First Amendment
protection to the District Council delineated the constitutional limit of one
governmental entity's influence over another, i.e., Congress' influence over the
legislative process of the District Council.
7 1
The reasoning of Miller and Clarke, two First Amendment decisions laden
with significant implications for the structural relationships between governmen-
tal entities, make the possibility of a First Amendment decision altering the
relationship between a state and the national government plausible. Following
the analysis of Clarke, a court could conceivably hold that the First Amendment
limits Congress' power to use funding to coerce legislators into voting for
certain legislation, even though such a holding would shift the balance of power
in national policymaking away from the central government.79 Clarke's First
Amendment analysis thus allows courts which evaluate federal conditional
spending measures to avoid the vexing justiciability problems often involved
in disputes over the distribution of political power among governmental institu-
tions, both within states and between states and the federal government.
75. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of whether the First Amendment limits
Congress' power to use conditional spending to influence state and local legislative voting. However, the
Court has found that conditioning federal benefits on individuals, refraining from speech triggers First
Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (discriminatory denial of
tax exemption for engaging in speech is limitation on free speech).
76. 878 F.2d 523 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 501 (1989).
77. Id. at 533.
78. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (en bane).
79. The cumulative effects of such a limitation on federal conditional spending would depend upon
precisely which and how many federal conditions are disallowed. Certainly, if a particular conditional
spending measure is invalidated on First Amendment grounds, Congress could seek to achieve the same
or similar ends through direct legislation under its enumerated powers.
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B. Adjudicatory Reach of the First Amendment
Before Clarke's application of the First Amendment to legislative voting,
a legislator seeking judicial relief from the constraints of federal spending
conditions would probably have raised questions that courts were either unwill-
ing or unable to answer. These other challenges to federal spending measures
would falter because they raised nonjusticiable questions. In contrast, the First
Amendment approach, as applied in Clarke, promises to address congressional
threats to state and local legislative independence more effectively than other
constitutional principles.
The Guarantee Clause, which is one possible avenue for challenging restric-
tions on state and local legislative autonomy, necessarily implicates nonjus-
ticiable political questions." The Ninth and Tenth Amendments could also
form bases for constitutional challenges to federally imposed restrictions on
independent legislative voting. Such an approach would inevitably require
claimants to ask courts to resolve nonjusticiable questions about the un-
enumerated rights of the people and the extent of state autonomy guaranteed
by these often overlooked constitutional provisions. 81 Not suffering from these
difficulties, the First Amendment approach is more likely to protect independent
state legislative voting than the available alternatives."
While the First Amendment may be superior to the alternatives in terms
of justiciability, it is unclear whether courts can devise a judicially cognizable
First Amendment test appropriate for resolving disputes between state and local
legislators and Congress. Moreover, although judicial precedent demonstrates
that the First Amendment's protections reach legislators when they speak in
the course of discharging their legislative duties, it is not clear whether legisla-
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government...."). The protection of independent legislative voting in the states would
seem to fit under the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Clause has been viewed as
nonjusticiable in a wide variety of cases beginning with Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). But
cf. Thomas C. Berg, Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 208 (1987) (arguing for judicial review under the Guarantee Clause).
81. For discussion of the Ninth Amendment's nonjusticiability, see Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise
the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What On Earth Can You Do With the Ninth
Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 251-52 (1988). As for judicial treatment of the Tenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
effectively removes the courts from the process of determining the proper distribution of power between
federal and state governments. Specifically, the Court concluded that the judiciary lacks the power "to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 550. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 175-259 (1980) (arguing that political branches, not federal judiciary, should decide
constitutional questions of national government's power vis-ai-vis the states).
82. Assuming that challenges to federal conditional spending measures under the Guarantee Clause,
Ninth Amendment, and Tenth Amendment are nonjusticiable, a challenge to those same measures under
the First Amendment's protection of legislative voting could still proceed. Since First Amendment claims
are "not so enmeshed with those political question elements which render [the] Guarant[ee] Clause" and




tive voting falls within the umbrella of expressive conduct shielded by the First
Amendment. The remainder of this Note addresses these questions and con-
cludes that all federal conditional spending measures that impede independent
state or local legislative voting necessarily trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
C. The First Amendment and State Legislators: A First Amendment Test for
Federal Conditional Spending Measures
The three federal opinions declaring that First Amendment protection
extends to legislative voting rely prominently on Bond v. Floyd, the first case
to propose that the First Amendment protects "legislative speech."83 As a
result, an understanding of Bond is critical to this Note's analysis.
Julian Bond, a Black man elected to the Georgia House of Representatives,
was denied his seat in that assembly allegedly due to statements he made in
opposition to the United States' military involvement in Vietnam. The Court
held that the Georgia Legislature's refusal to seat Bond infringed upon his right
of free expression under the First Amendment. s' Anchored in the ideology of
republican government, 5 the Court's opinion in Bond linked First Amendment
safeguards of expression to the underlying values of representative government.
The Court declared that legislators have "an obligation to take positions on
controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed
by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office."86
The Bond Court did not, however, indicate whether or not voting falls
within the scope of protected legislative speech. Similarly, while it highlighted
the paramount importance of uninhibited local legislative speech for democratic
government and set forth a tangible standard to protect such speech, 7 Bond
did not provide a test for evaluating restrictions on legislative voting.8
Such a test, however, is not difficult to conceive. It requires consideration
of three questions. First, does vote casting in a legislative context constitute
expressive conduct permitting legislators to invoke a First Amendment chal-
lenge to conditional spending measures? Second, at what point does a particular
funding condition "restrict" free expression? Third, what level of First Amend-
ment scrutiny should apply?
83. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
84. Id. at 137.
85. The Court noted that constituents have an interest in a legislator's ability to take positions on
controversial political questions "so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person they
have elected to represent them." Id. at 136-37.
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 135-37.
88. But see id. at 132. The Court drew a distinction between permissible content-based regulations of
legislative speech (e.g., constitutional provisions requiring legislators to take an oath swearing to uphold
the Constitution) and impermissible "sham" rules (e.g., a rule authorizing a majority of state legislators to
arbitrarily test the "sincerity" with which another duly elected legislator swears to uphold the Constitution).
1991]
The Yale Law Journal
As a preliminary matter, a court should not have difficulty finding that
legislative voting constitutes expressive conduct. Legislative voting is conducted
with expressive intent and effect. Specifically, it conveys a particularized
political message critical to a properly functioning representative democracy.
The response to the second question is more difficult to conceptualize. Like
statutes in other "unconstitutional conditions" cases, the conditional funding
measures on which this Note focuses are not laws that prohibit the exercise of
the right of free expression. Rather, they can be seen as "inducing" or "coerc-
ing" its waiver or non-exercise. In recognition of the ambiguities inherent in
identifying coercion or inducement, this Note borrows from recent scholarship
that reformulates the "coercion test" as a requirement that conditional spending
measures not upset the balance of power between beneficiaries of individual
rights and the government. Under this framework, it seems clear that nearly all
spending measures offering state governments financial benefits in exchange
for particular legislative enactments will trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
Conditional spending measures alter the balance of power between a state
legislator and the federal government by restricting the legislator's ability to
participate in and respond to public debate honestly and uninhibitedly. Thus,
edicts of the federal government effectively replace policies generated by public
discourse and debate among the people.
The answer to the third question involves issues of jurisdiction and inten-
tion. Where conditional spending measures compel state legislators to exercise
the will of Congress in areas beyond Congress' constitutionally prescribed
jurisdiction, those measures should be subject to the relaxed "incidental abridg-
ment" of expression standard set forth in United States v. O'Brien.89 On the
other hand, when Congress passes conditional spending measures designed to
result in state legislators carrying out Congress' will in policy areas over which
Congress could exercise direct control, those conditions should be subject to
the strict level of scrutiny appropriate for content-based regulations of expres-
sion.90
89. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Scrutiny in "incidental abridgment" cases generally requires a regulation
of expression to advance a "substantial" government interest, and to be the least restrictive means available
to the government for advancing that interest.
90. Strict scrutiny generally requires that a regulation of expression advances a "compelling" govern-
ment interest and is "narrowly drawn" to achieve that end. Id.
[Vol. 101: 233
Legislative Voting
D. Applying the New Test: Evaluating Conditional Federal Spending Measures
Under the First Amendment
This section examines in more detail the three components of the proposed
First Amendment test for federal conditional spending measures. It concludes
that all federal spending conditioned on state legislative enactments should
trigger First Amendment scrutiny, but that the level of scrutiny applied should
depend upon whether or not Congress has the power to enact the desired
legislation directly.
1. Legislative Voting As Nonfungible Expressive Conduct
The Clarke court identified legislative voting as expressive conduct.
According to the court, "[a] legislator's vote is inherently expressive."91 A
legislator's vote goes beyond the merely "mechanical" function of disposing
with proposed legislation. It registers the ""'will, preference, or choice" of an
individual legislator.' "92 Drawing upon language used by the Supreme Court
in the flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson, 3 to determine whether certain
forms of conduct constitute expression, the Clarke court stated that the vote of
a legislator is protected expression because it is intended to "convey a particu-
larized message" which will be understood by constituents and other observ-
ers. 9
4
This view accurately reflects the reality of legislative voting. While legisla-
tors have a variety of mechanisms for transmitting their opinions to others, only
a vote discharges an expression of opinion with finality and in unquestionable
agreement with colleagues voting the same way. Moreover, because each vote
is an individual expression of opinion, the independence of each vote constitutes
the foundation of authentic representation.
Another look at the D.C. Council members' response to the Armstrong
Amendment illustrates the uniquely expressive quality of legislative voting vis-
4t-vis other legislative activities. Presumably, individual Council members could
have voted for the legislation prescribed by the Armstrong Amendment and
simultaneously voted for a nonbinding resolution criticizing both the legislation
and Congress for compelling their votes in favor of the legislation. On the one
hand, such a resolution would express opposition to the legislation. On the other
hand, voting for such nonbinding language would express an idea distinct from
a vote against the actual amendment. While a vote for the nonbinding resolution
91. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404,411 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
92. Id. at 411 (quoting Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1414 (5th ed. 1979)), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989)).
93. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
94. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 412 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974))).
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would express limited opposition, a vote against the actual legislation would
express a refusal, on the part of the individual legislator, to support the use of
resources or the employment of force to further the policy. Although if com-
pared, these two legislative votes would not reflect a sharp difference of
opinion, they would certainly convey a difference in the intensity of opinion.
The same could be said for the votes of members of the Hull Redevel-
opment Authority whose removal for their continued support of a housing
project for the elderly was at issue in Miller v. Town of Hull.95 While a non-
binding resolution would have also expressed opposition to the Board's devel-
opment plans, the vote for the housing project was a stronger statement in favor
of a positive commitment of resources to support the project. A vote for legisla-
tion and a vote for a nonbinding resolution each reflects a distinct value
judgment by the legislator, and each is uniquely expressive despite the identical
subject matter.96
Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, Gregory Lee Johnson may have had alterna-
tive means to express outrage at the policies of the U.S. Government; yet, none
of these alternatives could have captured the intensity of outrage and defiance
that burning the national symbol expressed. 97 Voting, like flag burning, is a
nonfungible, expressive act. Statements and other votes may amend or alter a
legislator's political position, but each vote has an expressive quality indelibly
etched into the legislator's record.
2. Clearing Up Coercion: A Structural Approach to Addressing
Unconstitutional Conditions and Restrictions on Legislative Voting
Concerned about the unrestrained power of Congress to regulate individual
and state governmental activity through the funding mechanism, courts and
commentators have searched for limits. The doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions" emerged from this search. Courts frequently apply this constitution-
al limitation on conditional spending through the application of the "coercion
test." The "coercion test" essentially prohibits conditions that induce benefici-
aries of federal government spending to waive inalienable constitutional guaran-
95. 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 509 (1989).
96. One serious objection to characterizing legislative voting as expressive conduct suggests that it is
quintessential "governance" unprotected by the First Amendment. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625,
646 n.12 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This objection, however, fails to make a critical distinction
between the act of casting a legislative vote, which is an individual's expression that alone has no coercive
effect, with government action authorized by the full body of the legislature. The fact that individual
legislators often vote in the minority and do not prevail on a particular question before the chamber
illustrates this distinction. Certainly, these minority votes do not themselves constitute government action.
Similarly, a great many legislative votes never result in government action due to legislative bicameralism
and executive veto. A rebuttal might assert, however, that conditional spending targets government action
and not individual legislative votes. However, even assuming that one could satisfactorily demonstrate such
a motive, First Amendment scrutiny still applies because, against the background of democratic state legisla-
tures, conditional spending necessarily contemplates a direct impact on the votes of individual legislators.
97. 491 U.S. at 404-05 (1989) (discussing unique "communicative nature ofconduct relating to flags").
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tees in order to receive government benefits.98 The Supreme Court derived
this test by construing individual rights provisions in the Constitution as limit-
ing Congress' power to attach conditions when supplying government benefits
to individuals.99 Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amend-
ment rights of individuals provide such a constitutional bar to conditional
federal spending. t°° In contrast, when states argue that conditions attached
to federal grants for state governments violate the Tenth Amendment and other
constitutional provisions, the Court has been unwilling to read a limitation on
Congress' spending power into these provisions.101
By asserting that "the Armstrong Amendment coerces the Council mem-
bers' votes on a particular piece of legislation,"'" the Clarke court may have
broken the deadlock on constitutional challenges to federal spending conditions
applied to states and localities. Clarke's analytic contribution is that, for the
first time in an unconstitutional conditions case, a federal court shifted the
judicial focus from the condition's effect on state and local governmental
autonomy and from nonjusticiable federalism questions to a more concrete
individual rights formulation. In spite of this innovation, however, the Clarke
court remained mired in the analytic ambiguities of the coercion test.
Indeed, Clarke's application of the coercion test raised more questions than
it answered. At what point does such coercion occur? Must it be, as in Clarke,
that release of the entire governmental budget is conditioned upon a particular
legislative act? Is it necessary that the salaries of legislators be at stake?1°
98. "Coercion" is interchangeable with "inducement" in the courts and for the purposes of this Note.
Another set of unconstitutional conditions cases has required a showing of "germaneness" or relatedness
of the condition to the purposes of the funding provision. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning building permit on granting of public access easement by property owners
was unrelated to purpose for which building in question might have been banned).
99. Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
100. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating condition
denying federal public broadcasting funds to stations engaging in editorializing); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513,518-19 (1958) (holding state requirement that veterans take loyalty oath before receiving property
tax exemption violates First Amendment).
101. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), for example, several states challenged conditioning
a portion of federal grants to states designated for the construction of interstate highways on states adoption
of the national minimum drinking age. Part of the challenge focused on the Tenth Amendment's limitation
on congressional regulation of state affairs. The Court found no infringement of state sovereignty because
a state "could, and did, adopt 'the "simple expedient" of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion.'
Id. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947)). The states also argued
that the Tventy-first Amendment bars the federal government from regulating the drinking age. The Court
found that while the Twenty-first Amendment limits Congress' power to regulate directly the distribution
of alcohol, "constitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its spending power are less exacting
than those on its authority to regulate directly." Id. at 209 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66
(1936)).
102. Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404,417 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 E2d 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
103. Although this issue was not addressed by the Clarke court, the Armstrong Amendment, by
conditioning the totality of the District government's budget, including expenditure of locally raised funds,
also conditioned the appropriation of Council members' salaries. While a threat to the personal fiscal affairs
of an individual legislator arguably may be the minimal threshold for triggering common law notions of
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The court did not attempt to explain its conclusion beyond stating that the
threatened shutdown of municipal government "compelled" legislators to vote
in favor of the proposed amendments." 4 The court did not indicate what, if
any, less severe consequences would amount to coercion. Clearly, if the princi-
ples in Clarke regarding the protection of independent legislative voting are to
be taken seriously, courts must either develop a more generalized system for
identifying coercion or find a substitute for the coercion test.
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to explain fully every new
approach to identifying unconstitutional conditions, the Note does explain how
application of the federalism and republicanism principles set forth in Sections
B and C of Part I could have informed Clarke, and possibly other cases,
without the ambiguities inherent in the coercion test.
The "structural" approach to unconstitutional conditions set forth in recent
works provides a superior analytic framework to replace the coercion test. In
particular, it provides a useful vehicle for evaluating federal statutes that condi-
tion funding for states on the enactment of federally prescribed legislation.
Taking this approach, Professors Sullivan, 5 Kreimer,0 6 and Rosenthal 7
contend that unconstitutional conditions, no less than direct infringements on
liberties, can alter the "balance of power" between the government and rights
holders in the federal system, and that the preservation of this balance is the
gravamen of the validity of a condition. Their "structural" approach has two
basic advantages over the ambiguous coercion test in explaining the constitu-
tional infirmity of federal conditional spending measures.
First, by analyzing these measures under the structural approach, a court
focuses on the constitutional values that are really at stake when the federal
government conditions funding on state legislative enactments. Although these
measures directly threaten the First Amendment rights only of individual leg-
islators, those individual rights safeguard the entire polity's interest in a consti-
tutional structure that relies on representative state legislatures as independent
sources of political power.
The structural approach is better equipped to account for the polity's
interest in independent state legislatures because it emphasizes the role of
government and the effect of governmental policy on the balance of power in
the federal system. Conditional spending measures that transfer political power
in the form of free speech rights from individual state legislators to the federal
government effectively cede the polity's constitutionally guaranteed right to
legislative immunity, such a threat is not necessary to trigger a First Amendment challenge to spending
conditions.
104. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 409.
105. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1489-1505 (19S9).
106. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1382-95 (1984).




representative government at the state level. In evaluating conditional spending
measures under this rubric, courts can focus on the condition's actual effect on
the balance of power between the federal government and state legislators and
not on vague notions of coercion.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the pertinent "balance of
power" rests among those who have the power to speak as representatives of
citizens on matters of public concern. In other words, through the election
process, the people vest their state representatives with the First Amendment
right to vote freely, as their agents or trustees, on issues of public concern. A
federal spending condition that offers governmental benefits to a state in
exchange for a particular legislative enactment effectively alienates the in-
dividual legislator from her right of expression through voting. This, in turn,
alters the constitutionally prescribed balance of power by shifting independent
voting power away from the state legislator and enhancing the power of the
federal government." 8
The second advantage to the structural approach, like the first, dispenses
with the unnecessary ambiguities associated with the coercion test. In particular,
the structural approach does not require a court to make the quasi-psychological
finding that the government "coerced" a particular individual. Rather, the
structural approach applies constitutional scrutiny to any federal attempt to
condition funding on state legislative outcomes regardless of whether "coer-
cion" is demonstrated. This scrutiny applies because certain constitutional liber-
ties, while framed as individual rights, serve as structural constitutional counter-
balances to federal power. If the federal government could induce the waiver
of such counterbalancing rights, those rights would be worthless as safeguards
against federal excess.
It follows that the First Amendment's protection of free expression general-
ly, and of independent legislative voting in particular, is one such right that
state legislators should not be permitted to waive and that the federal govern-
ment should not be permitted to buy. As a cornerstone of authentic representa-
tion and federalism, the independent voting of state legislators is indispensable
to checking potential excesses of the federal government. Furthermore, legisla-
tors, when offered government benefits in exchange for waiving their First
Amendment rights to vote freely, might undervalue the constitutional and
structural values those rights serve." 9 Indeed, a legislator's right to vote freely
is not a personal privilege that can be waived but, rather, an inalienable right
108. State autonomy may actually be infringed to a lesser degree by direct federal legislation, where
the "political safeguards of federalism" shield states from federal excess, than when federal conditions are
attached to important funding measures upon which states are vitally dependent. Rosenthal, supra note 107,
at 1141-42, 1162-63; Sullivan, supra note 105, at 1500-01 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987), as an "easy case" for strict constitutional review).
109. Sullivan, supra note 105, at 1491.
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designed to protect the entire polity's interest in federalism and representative
government.
A legislator's First Amendment right to vote uninhibitedly on issues of
public concern serves the constitutional structural values of federalism and
representation. A legislator holds as trustee a right that serves the entire polity's
interest in constitutional government. Consequently, whether or not a particular
federal statute that conditions funding for states on a prescribed state legislative
enactment "coerces" legislative voting, such a statute implicates a First Amend-
ment interest worthy of judicial protection.
3. "Related To" Expression vs. "Incidental Abridgment"
Having established that legislative voting is expressive conduct and that
governmental attempts to influence state legislative enactments through condi-
tional spending restrict legislative voting, it remains to be determined what level
of First Amendment scrutiny courts should apply. In Clarke v. United States,
the answer to this question appeared relatively clear.11 Since Congress could
have enacted its amendments directly into the D.C. Human Rights Law, it could
not show any substantial justification for the Armstrong Amendment other than
the desire to have the City Council members enact the measure themselves."'
Thus, the court should have recognized the Armstrong Amendment as directly
related to the suppression of free legislative voting and, as such, subject to strict
First Amendment scrutiny. Similarly, in cases where Congress already has the
constitutional authority to legislate directly but instead chooses to employ the
conditional funding mechanism, courts should evaluate such measures as
content-based suppressions of expression. Unless the government articulates a
reason not related to the suppression of expression (i.e., Congress is able to
legislate directly in a particular field, but the diversity of conditions among the
states requires the flexibility of locally-devised versions of federal programs),
strict scrutiny should apply.
112
Another First Amendment problem arises where Congress does not already
possess the power to legislate directly over a certain subject matter yet tries to
impose its will through conditional spending designed to influence state legisla-
tion. At first blush, these measures seem more intrusive on state autonomy than
when Congress uses a conditional spending measure to accomplish an end that
could be constitutionally achieved with direct federal legislation. Ironically, this
use of conditional spending does not warrant strict First Amendment scrutiny
because the federal government can at least demonstrate a prima facie justifica-
tion for the measure that is entirely unrelated to expression. If the federal
government demonstrates that the Constitution prohibits direct congressional
110. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane).
111. Id. at413-15.
112. See supra note 90.
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regulation of a particular field, then the conditional funding measure is a
general regulation of conduct that only incidentally abridges expression. As
such, the more relaxed "incidental abridgment" standard of scrutiny set forth
in United States v. O'Brien should apply.113 To be sure, some infringement
of legislative independence will occur, even if only incidentally. This is why
the federal government must still demonstrate that the conditional funding
mechanism is the least restrictive means available for the regulation to pass
constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment's protection of free expression is an essential mecha-
nism providing for participation in democratic self-government by all members
of society. Nowhere is this mechanism more important than in the realm of
political decisionmaking.'14 If the legitimacy of government is to be measured
by the consent of the governed, uninhibited expressions of opinion must be
permitted to facilitate the formation of both individual judgments and the
common judgment.
Since Bond v. Floyd, legislators, like other members of society, have
enjoyed the protections of free expression embodied in the First Amendment.
Free expression in the legislature not only serves the deliberative process and
allows voters to choose their representatives according to their expressed beliefs
and opinions, it also reinforces the constitutional safeguards of federalism and
the separation of powers.
As an expressive act that registers the will, preference, and opinion of a
legislator, voting performs a unique communicative function. It expresses
loyalty or dissension, agreement or abstention. It can also inform voters of a
legislator's position on matters of public concern. Not only is legislative voting
expressive, it is also representative and political, and therefore critical to the
proper functioning of participatory democracy.
Recent judicial application of First Amendment protection to legislative
voting may have opened the door for states and localities to challenge federal
conditional spending measures on the ground that they restrict free expression.
In terms of its practical effects on federalism, this protection may not lead to
wholesale invalidation of the broad array of federal programs based on condi-
tional spending, but, at a minimum, it should instruct federal lawmakers and
courts to appreciate the vital role their more provincial counterparts perform
in our system of freedom of expression.
113. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
114. See generally Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420-21 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318
(1988); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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